Airline Interview Prep Pack

SOP deviations rarely come from malice. Causes include: fatigue (Ryanair crews fly up to 900 hours annually), complacency (experienced Captains may develop shortcuts after thousands of sectors), distraction (communication overload, personal stress), or genuine disagreement with the SOP (rare but possible). Understanding the 'why' helps you calibrate your response. A fatigued Captain who misses a checklist item needs a gentle 'Did we complete the approach checklist?' — not an aggressive confrontation. A Captain who deliberately skips a required procedure needs a firmer response.

When to Take Control — In extreme cases — the Captain is incapacitated, clearly impaired, or taking the aircraft into an unsafe situation and refusing to listen — the First Officer must take control. 'I have control' followed by a go-around or level-off, then a PAN PAN or MAYDAY as appropriate. This is exceptionally rare but you must be prepared to do it. You would prioritise the safety of 197 passengers over avoiding an awkward cockpit confrontation.

The Classic Follow-Up Scenario — PPRuNe candidates report this question is asked at virtually every Ryanair assessment, sometimes phrased as: 'What if your Captain says at cruise altitude, if not visual at DA, I'll land anyway because I'm tired?' The correct answer: 'I would acknowledge the Captain's fatigue, suggest we review the approach conditions closer to the time, and if at DA we are not visual, I would call go-around per SOP. I would not compromise the stabilised approach criteria regardless of the Captain's preference.' Ryanair's CRM training explicitly teaches this graduated response model — First Officers are expected and encouraged to speak up.

B737 Hydraulic Architecture and Degradation — the B737 has two primary systems (A and B, both 3,000 PSI) plus a standby system. System A: engine-driven pump on engine 1 + electric pump. System B: engine-driven pump on engine 2 + electric pump. Standby: backup for rudder, leading edge devices, and thrust reverser. Loss of a single system does not mean loss of flight control. System A failure: loss of some flight control hydraulic power, NWS limited to standby, ground spoilers affected on one side, thrust reverser on engine 1. System B failure: loss of some flight control power, autopilot B, leading edge devices transfer to standby, thrust reverser on engine 2.

Run the Appropriate Checklist — reference the QRH non-normal checklist for HYDRAULIC SYSTEM LOW PRESSURE. The checklist will guide you through: confirming the failure, checking associated systems, switching electric pumps as appropriate, and assessing what capabilities are lost. At Ryanair, QRH discipline is strictly enforced — do not attempt to troubleshoot from memory when you have a published procedure. The PM reads the checklist, the PF flies the aircraft.

Decision: Continue or Return — with the aircraft flyable on one hydraulic system, the decision depends on: distance to destination (30 minutes is close), weather at destination versus departure, airport facilities (runway length, emergency services), and whether the situation is stable or deteriorating. If the indication is stable and one system is confirmed failed with the other operating normally, continuing to a destination 30 minutes away is often a reasonable decision — provided the approach and landing are planned for the degraded configuration. However, if there is any sign of a second system degrading, return immediately.

Plan the Approach — with the aircraft flyable on one system, brief for a precautionary approach: reduced braking, asymmetric thrust reverser, longer landing distance. Contact Ryanair OCC via ACARS for maintenance guidance. Brief cabin crew for a possible abnormal landing. Configure early — late configuration changes on one hydraulic system increase workload.

During Takeoff (After V1) — If a bird strike occurs after V1, the takeoff continues regardless of the impact — there is insufficient runway remaining to stop. After becoming airborne, the crew assesses the damage: engine parameters (any N1/N2 drop, EGT rise, vibration?), airframe (any unusual handling, pressurisation issues?), and systems (any ECAM warnings?). If an engine has ingested birds and is damaged or failed, the crew follows the engine failure after V1 procedure: maintain V2, follow the engine-out departure, and manage the ECAM. If the engine continues to run but with reduced performance, close monitoring is required — delayed engine damage from bird ingestion can cause failure minutes after the initial strike.

During Approach — A bird strike on approach is particularly challenging because the crew is already in a high-workload, low-altitude phase. The immediate priority is maintaining aircraft control and flight path. If an engine is affected (surge, flame-out, vibration), the crew must decide: continue the approach and land (if the runway is in sight and the aircraft is stabilised) or go around (if the approach is not stabilised or the engine damage makes continued approach unsafe). The decision depends on altitude, speed, configuration, and the severity of the damage. A bird strike that causes a dual engine failure on approach is extremely rare but would require an immediate forced landing — the A320's APU can be started in-flight for electrical and hydraulic backup.

Post-Strike Actions — After landing safely: (1) Taxi clear of the runway carefully (landing gear damage from bird strike is possible). (2) Shut down the affected engine if still running with abnormal parameters. (3) Declare the incident to ATC and request emergency services if needed. (4) Complete the tech log entry and arrange an engineering inspection before the aircraft flies again — bird strike damage to engines, leading edges, radome, pitot probes, and windshield must be assessed against AMM limits. (5) File an Air Safety Report and a bird strike report (contributing to the airport's wildlife management programme).

easyJet Operational Context — Bird strikes are a regular occurrence across easyJet's European network — particularly at coastal airports (Nice, Faro, Lisbon), airports near water bodies (Amsterdam, Geneva), and during seasonal migration periods (spring and autumn). easyJet crews are trained to manage bird strike scenarios during recurrent simulation, with emphasis on engine ingestion during critical phases. The A320's CFM56 and LEAP-1A engines are certified to withstand ingestion of a 4-lb bird (medium-sized) without catastrophic failure — but larger birds or flocks can exceed this certification limit. Pilots who operate regularly from bird-prone airports incorporate bird activity into their TEM briefings: 'Threat: significant bird activity reported on final for runway 27, likely from the nearby salt marshes. Countermeasure: lights on, heightened awareness on short final, prepared for go-around if bird activity intensifies.'

ECAM Procedure Management — The A320's ECAM system will display the engine failure and guide the crew through the associated procedure. Typical steps include: confirming which engine has failed (N1/N2 indications, EGT, fuel flow — verify the correct engine before taking any action), managing the thrust lever for the failed engine (to idle if still windmilling, or cutoff if a shutdown is required), confirming engine fire status (if ECAM indicates fire → memory item: Engine Fire procedure, which includes the engine fire pushbutton and agent discharge), and managing the consequential system effects (loss of one hydraulic system, loss of one generator, potential bleed air reconfiguration). The PM reads each ECAM action, the PF confirms before execution — no action is taken without crew coordination.

Single-Engine Flight Management — The A320 flies well on one engine — the fly-by-wire system compensates for the asymmetric thrust, and the remaining engine at MCT (Maximum Continuous Thrust) provides adequate performance for level flight and descent at most altitudes. However, the crew must manage: drift-down to a lower cruise altitude if current altitude is above single-engine service ceiling, reduced climb performance (affecting obstacle clearance on departure or missed approach), increased fuel burn on the operating engine, and the need to plan for a single-engine approach and landing. The approach must be briefed with engine-out considerations: potentially higher approach speed, reduced go-around performance, and the need for the runway to accommodate the increased landing distance.

Diversion Decision — Following an engine failure, the crew must decide: continue to destination or divert. Factors include: distance to destination vs nearest suitable airport, weather at both, runway length and emergency services availability, fuel state on one engine, and passenger/crew welfare. easyJet's SOPs and the ECAM STATUS page will indicate any landing distance increase or approach limitations. In easyJet's European network, suitable diversion airports are usually within 30–60 minutes of single-engine flight from any point on the route — the short-haul network provides a natural safety net of nearby alternates.

easyJet Training Context — Engine failure is the most practised non-normal scenario in easyJet's recurrent simulator training. Pilots train for engine failure at all phases: during takeoff roll (before V1 — reject; after V1 — continue), after takeoff (maintain V2, follow engine-out SID), during cruise (drift-down, diversion decision), and during approach (single-engine ILS, single-engine go-around). The emphasis is on systematic ECAM management, clear crew communication, and calm decision-making. easyJet's assessors during the simulator assessment will evaluate how you handle an engine failure — not whether you panic, but whether you follow the procedure systematically and make sound decisions.

Graduated Response — From Prompt to Go-Around Call — Your response follows the graduated assertiveness model, compressed into the 15–20 seconds available between 1,000 feet and a point where continued approach becomes unsafe. Step 1 (immediate): State the deviation — 'Speed high, 15 above Vapp.' This gives the Captain the specific correction needed. Step 2 (2–3 seconds later if no correction): Direct suggestion — 'Recommend reducing speed and selecting Conf Full now.' Step 3 (5 seconds later if still not stabilised): Clear escalation — 'We are not stabilised, I recommend go-around.' Step 4 (if Captain does not respond or continues): Assert — 'Going around' and push the TOGA buttons. On the A320, either pilot can initiate a go-around by pressing TOGA — the autothrust applies go-around thrust, the flight director commands the SRS pitch mode, and the Flight Management system sequences to the missed approach. You are exercising your legal authority under EASA regulations and BA's SOPs. There is no scenario in which continuing an unstabilised approach below 1,000 feet is the correct answer.

Why This Matters — Data on Unstabilised Approaches — This is not a theoretical exercise: unstabilised approaches are the single largest precursor to approach-and-landing accidents, which account for approximately 65% of all commercial aviation accidents. The Flight Safety Foundation's global data shows that approximately 3% of all approaches are unstabilised at 1,000 feet, but only 3% of those trigger a go-around — meaning 97% of unstabilised approaches are continued to landing. The reason is authority gradient pressure: the FO sees the instability but does not want to challenge the Captain, or the Captain recognises the instability but commits to salvaging the approach rather than accepting the go-around. BA's simulator assessment is specifically designed to test this scenario — the CRM element of the A380 sim will likely include a situation where your partner (acting as Captain) flies an approach that becomes unstable, and the assessors are watching to see whether you call it. Remaining silent and allowing an unstabilised approach to continue will fail you on the CRM assessment, regardless of how well you flew your own sector.

Post-Go-Around Actions and Debrief — After initiating the go-around, fly the missed approach procedure as briefed: maintain SRS guidance, retract flap on schedule, and configure for the hold or the second approach as appropriate. Contact ATC to advise you are going around and request vectors. Brief the cabin crew: 'We were not happy with the approach, we will be making another attempt — cabin crew please remain seated.' After landing on the second attempt, debrief with the Captain privately: 'I called the go-around because we were not stabilised at the gate — speed was 15 above and we were in Conf 1 at 1,000 feet.' Frame it factually, not accusatorially. If the Captain disagrees with your call, listen to their perspective but stand by the data — the parameters were out of range, and the SOP mandates a go-around. If the Captain's behaviour pattern suggests a recurring issue (multiple unstabilised approaches), you have a professional obligation to submit a safety report so the fleet training system can address it. At BA, a go-around is never criticised — it is the expected and correct response to an unstabilised approach, and the airline's just culture protects the crew member who makes the call. At British Airways, this technical knowledge is directly applicable to the airline's fleet operations, where A320 family aircraft (A319, A320, A321) operate high-frequency short-haul routes from Heathrow Terminal 5 and Gatwick, while the long-haul fleet includes A350-1000, B777, and B787 Dreamliner aircraft serving BA's global network of over 200 destinations.

Collaboration in Practice — Describe how you actively foster a collaborative cockpit environment from the moment you meet your crew partner. Your pre-flight brief sets the tone: rather than delivering a monologue, you invite the Captain's input, discuss threat and error management for the specific sector, agree on task-sharing during high-workload phases, and establish clear communication preferences. During the flight, collaboration means maintaining a shared mental model — both pilots knowing the plan, the current status, and the contingencies at all times. You achieve this through standard callouts, cross-checking each other's actions, and voicing your SA (situational awareness) proactively rather than waiting to be asked. At BA, where short-haul pilots may fly three to four sectors per day into airports ranging from straightforward like Amsterdam to complex like Innsbruck or London City, this collaborative foundation ensures that the workload is shared appropriately even when the operational tempo is high.

Assertiveness When Required — Describe a specific scenario where you needed to be assertive and explain how you escalated your communication using the graduated assertiveness model: hint, suggest, ask, tell, and ultimately take control if safety demands it. For example, if you noticed an unstable approach developing — deviation from the glideslope, airspeed decaying below Vapp, or excessive crosswind component — you would initially suggest a correction: 'Speed is dropping, might want to add a little thrust.' If the situation continued, you would escalate: 'I recommend a go-around, we are not stabilised.' And if the Captain did not respond, you would take positive action: 'Going around' — because BA's SOPs and EASA regulations give either pilot the authority and responsibility to initiate a go-around when stabilised approach criteria are not met. Emphasise that assertiveness in aviation is not about ego or overriding authority — it is about ensuring that critical safety information reaches the decision-maker in time to act on it.

Adapting the Balance to Different Captains — Explain that one of the most nuanced skills as a First Officer at BA is reading each Captain's leadership style and calibrating your balance of assertiveness and collaboration accordingly. Some Captains prefer a highly collaborative, egalitarian cockpit where both pilots contribute equally to every decision. Others prefer a more structured command dynamic where the FO focuses primarily on monitoring and speaks up for safety issues rather than routine decisions. Both styles can be effective, and your job is to adapt while maintaining your own safety standards and professional obligations.

At BA, you might fly with a different Captain every day across a roster of 4,000 pilots, so this adaptability is not theoretical — it is a daily practice. State that your approach is to brief expectations explicitly at the start of every flight: 'I will monitor actively and call out any deviations. If I see something that concerns me, I will raise it immediately. Is there anything specific you would like me to prioritise today?' This opening invitation creates the space for both collaboration and assertiveness from the first moment.