On the evening of 5 February 2026, Scandinavian Airlines flight SK2590 — an Airbus A320neo registered SE-ROM — was cleared for departure from Brussels Airport runway 07R. What happened next is being studied by safety investigators across Europe: instead of taxiing onto the runway, the captain turned the aircraft onto a parallel taxiway and commenced a takeoff roll, accelerating to 127 knots before the first officer recognised the error and called for an emergency stop.
No one on board was injured. The aircraft sustained no damage. But the Belgian Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU) has classified this as a serious incident — and the preliminary report, released in March 2026, raises questions about crew situational awareness, airport design, ATC monitoring systems, and what additional technology might prevent a recurrence.
How It Unfolded
SK2590 was cleared to depart runway 07R via Taxiway C6. The aircraft taxied via Taxiway Outer toward the runway entry point. At the critical junction, the captain turned the aircraft onto the parallel taxiway rather than continuing to the runway threshold. The crew completed their before-takeoff checklists — on the taxiway — and commenced the takeoff roll.
The first officer made the standard "100 knots" callout. But the captain did not respond. According to the preliminary report, the captain observed that "the forward view appeared increasingly narrow" but did not react immediately. It was the first officer who recognised the problem, looked outside, and immediately called out: "No, this is wrong. Stop, stop, stop, stop."
The captain applied full reverse thrust and maximum braking. The aircraft decelerated from 127 knots and came to rest near Taxiway C1 — just in front of runway guard lights and a construction fence. Passengers were deplaned via air stairs and bussed back to the terminal.
What Investigators Are Examining
The Belgian AAIU has outlined several areas for further investigation: the actions, workload, training, and communication of both pilots; ATC procedures and the controller's monitoring of the aircraft's surface movement; the aerodrome layout including lighting and signage at the critical junction; the performance of the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS), which should provide alerts when aircraft deviate from their cleared route; and the potential use of onboard systems — such as Airport Moving Maps — that could prevent similar occurrences.
SAS has already responded proactively: the airline has begun equipping its fleet with Airport Moving Map (AMM) technology, which displays the aircraft's real-time position on a detailed airport diagram in the cockpit. Several major airlines already use AMM systems, but adoption across European short-haul operators has been uneven.
Why This Matters for Pilot Candidates
For aspiring airline pilots preparing for assessment interviews, this incident is a textbook case study in several competencies that airlines actively assess: situational awareness during ground operations, CRM communication (the first officer's decisive intervention likely prevented a catastrophe), the importance of standard callouts and responses (the captain's failure to respond to "100 knots" was the first external signal that something was wrong), and the willingness to speak up when something does not look right — regardless of the other pilot's seniority.
Runway incursions and surface movement errors remain among the highest-risk categories in aviation safety. EUROCONTROL data consistently ranks runway incursions as one of the top safety priorities for European airports. At complex airports with parallel taxiways and runways — Brussels, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf — the risk of a wrong turn at night or in low visibility is genuine. This is why airlines like Eurowings, Ryanair, and easyJet include taxiway awareness and runway incursion prevention in their recurrent CRM training.
The first officer's response in this incident — clear, immediate, and unambiguous — is exactly the kind of assertive communication that CQ assessors and airline interviewers evaluate. Saying "No, this is wrong. Stop." to a captain mid-takeoff requires confidence, situational awareness, and the CRM training to act decisively under pressure. It is a textbook example of the First Officer's role as a safety barrier.
The Bigger Picture
This is not the first taxiway departure attempt in aviation history. Singapore Airlines flight SQ006 crashed during a takeoff from a closed runway at Taipei in 2000. More recently, Air Canada flight 759 nearly landed on a taxiway at San Francisco in 2017 where four loaded aircraft were waiting. Each of these events reinforced the same lesson: the ground environment is where many of aviation's most dangerous moments begin. Technology — Airport Moving Maps, A-SMGCS alerts, enhanced lighting — helps. But the final barrier is always the crew. In Brussels, that barrier held. The investigation will determine what needs to change so the barrier is never tested this closely again.
Career angle: This incident is exactly the kind of CRM scenario that comes up in airline interviews — "What would you do if you noticed the Captain was about to take off from the wrong surface?" Having a clear, structured answer shows the assertive communication that assessors score for. Our Interview Prep Pack includes scenario-based CRM questions like this for 30 airlines.
