TUI Airways Pilot Interview Questions 2026

I Would Brief Funchal's Unique Challenges Thoroughly — If operating to Funchal in marginal weather on a B737, I would brief the specific threats: Funchal Airport (LPMA) has a displaced threshold, a runway shelf extending over the ocean on pillars, frequent windshear from the surrounding terrain (mountains up to 1,862m), and complex visual manoeuvring procedures. I would set firm personal minimums above the published minimums if the weather is marginal, brief the go-around procedure in detail, and be prepared to divert to Porto Santo or return to departure if conditions deteriorate. I would not attempt a "let's have a look" approach at Funchal.

Assessing the Marginal Weather — With gusty crosswinds approaching limits and the Captain asking for my input, I would structure my assessment around three questions: Can we legally attempt the approach? Can we safely complete it? And what is our plan if we cannot? For legality, I would check the crosswind limit for the B737-800 (demonstrated crosswind component is 33 knots, but TUI's SOPs may impose lower limits for specific runways at Funchal due to the terrain and wind gradient factors). I would check the latest ATIS/METAR for the actual wind — not just the steady-state wind but the gust factor, because a report of '250/22G38' means the crosswind component could spike to the gust value during the flare. I would review the TAF for trend: is the wind expected to increase (deteriorating), remain stable, or decrease (improving)? And I would check the NOTAM for any additional restrictions — Funchal sometimes has temporary approach restrictions during high wind events.

My Recommendation to the Captain — Based on the data, I would give a clear recommendation. If the crosswind component at the gust value exceeds the aircraft limit or TUI's Funchal-specific SOP limit, my recommendation is straightforward: 'Captain, the crosswind is above our limit at the gust factor. I recommend we hold for [time based on TAF improvement] or divert to [alternate — typically Porto Santo, Lisbon, or Las Palmas depending on fuel and weather].' If the crosswind is within limits but marginal — say 28 knots steady with gusts to 33 — my recommendation would be: 'Captain, we are within limits but the gusty conditions and Funchal's terrain make this a high-workload approach. I recommend we attempt one approach: if we are stable at 500 feet with the runway in sight and the crosswind manageable, we land. If at any point the approach becomes unstable or we get a windshear indication, we go around immediately and divert. I would suggest briefing the go-around and diversion before we start the approach so the plan is clear.' This gives the Captain a structured recommendation with clear decision gates, rather than a vague 'I think we should try it.'

CRM: Supporting the Captain's Decision — The Captain makes the final decision, and I must respect that authority while ensuring my input is heard. If the Captain decides to attempt the approach despite my concerns, I maintain my PM duties with heightened vigilance: calling deviations from the approach path immediately, monitoring the windshear detection system, calling 'Stable' or 'Unstable' at 500 feet without hesitation, and being ready to call 'Go around' if the stabilised approach criteria are not met.

If the Captain decides to divert, I support by calculating fuel to the alternate, communicating with ATC, and preparing a PA for the 189 passengers: 'Ladies and gentlemen, due to the strong winds at Funchal, your Captain has decided to divert to Lisbon where conditions are suitable for a safe landing. We apologise for the change of plan, and TUI's ground team will arrange your onward transport to Madeira.' The key TUI principle: safety always wins over schedule. A diversion disappoints passengers temporarily; an accident at Funchal destroys lives permanently. TUI's assessors want to see that you will recommend the safe option clearly and support the Captain's decision either way.

No-Bleed Architecture: The Fundamental Shift — The B787 Dreamliner's electrical architecture is revolutionary because it eliminates the traditional reliance on engine bleed air for major aircraft systems, replacing it with electrically powered equivalents. On a conventional aircraft like the B737-800, high-pressure bleed air from the engine compressor stages powers the air conditioning packs, cabin pressurisation, wing anti-ice, engine cowl anti-ice, and hydraulic reservoir pressurisation. This bleed extraction costs approximately 2-5 percent of engine thrust depending on the demand. The B787 removes nearly all bleed air extraction — the only remaining bleed use is for engine cowl anti-ice and the pressurisation of the hydraulic reservoirs. Everything else is electric: the cabin environmental control system uses electrically driven compressors, the wing anti-ice uses electro-thermal heating blankets embedded in the leading edge, and the hydraulic pumps are electrically driven. This no-bleed architecture recovers that 2-5 percent thrust penalty, contributing to the B787's overall fuel efficiency advantage.

Power Generation: 1.45 Megawatts — To support this electrical demand, the B787 generates approximately 1.45 megawatts (1,450 kVA) of electrical power — roughly 10 times what the B737-800 produces. Each of the two engines drives two generators: two 250 kVA variable-frequency (VF) generators per engine, giving four engine-driven generators producing 1,000 kVA total. The APU drives two additional 225 kVA generators for ground operations and backup. The B787 uses variable-frequency AC power at 230V (not the 115V/400Hz constant-frequency AC of the B737), which eliminates the need for constant-speed drives (CSDs) that are a maintenance-intensive component on older aircraft. The 230V system allows thinner, lighter wiring for the same power transmission, reducing airframe weight. The distribution architecture includes a left and right main AC bus, essential bus architecture with automatic bus-tie logic, and a ground-handling bus for external power operations. In a dual-engine-failure scenario, the B787 has a Ram Air Turbine (RAT) that deploys automatically to provide essential electrical power and hydraulic pressure.

Operational Benefits for TUI — For TUI's long-haul operations to Cancún, Punta Cana, Montego Bay, and Indian Ocean destinations, the electrical architecture provides specific advantages. The elimination of bleed ducts reduces the risk of bleed air leaks, which on conventional aircraft can trigger duct overheat warnings, cabin smoke events, and costly unscheduled maintenance — all of which cause diversions and delays that affect TUI's holiday schedules and customer satisfaction. The electrically heated wing anti-ice system provides more precise and uniform heating than bleed-air-fed piccolo tubes, improving ice protection reliability during transatlantic crossings where icing conditions in the North Atlantic are common.

The environmental control system's electric compressors allow more precise temperature and humidity control — the B787 cabin maintains approximately 6,000 feet cabin altitude (versus 8,000 feet on most conventional aircraft) and higher humidity levels, reducing passenger fatigue on long sectors. For TUI's holiday market, passengers arriving at Cancún after a 10-hour flight in a B787 feel measurably better than those arriving on a conventional widebody, which directly supports TUI's customer experience strategy.

Interview Relevance and Technical Depth — The assessors want to see whether you understand the B787 at a systems level beyond surface-level facts. For a TUI interview, the key talking points are: no-bleed architecture (know what it replaces and why), power generation numbers (1,450 kVA, four engine-driven generators at 250 kVA each, two APU generators at 225 kVA), the shift to 230V variable-frequency AC, and the operational benefits (efficiency, reliability, passenger comfort).

If asked follow-up questions, be prepared to discuss: how the electrical system degrades in failure scenarios (generator failure → bus-tie logic → load shedding → essential buses only), what the RAT provides (emergency power and hydraulic pressure), and why variable-frequency generation is simpler than constant-frequency (no CSD required). This level of knowledge signals to TUI's assessors that you have studied the Dreamliner proactively and understand why TUI invested in the type for its long-haul fleet — it is not just a range capability but a fundamentally different technology philosophy that reduces operating costs and improves passenger experience.

Immediate Assessment — Over the mid-Atlantic with augmented crew on a B787, a medical emergency adds unique complexity that does not exist on a short-haul B737 sector. My immediate actions would be: confirm the nature and severity of the medical emergency with the cabin crew (is the passenger conscious? Breathing? Is CPR in progress?), assess the available medical resources on board (the B787 carries a medical kit and an automated external defibrillator, and the cabin crew are trained in first aid), and if possible, make a PA requesting any medical professionals among the passengers. Simultaneously, I would contact a ground-based medical advisory service — many airlines subscribe to services like MedAire or STAT-MD that provide real-time medical guidance from emergency physicians via satellite communication. The doctor on the ground can advise whether the passenger's condition requires immediate diversion or can be managed until arrival at the planned destination.

Diversion Decision-Making — This is the critical decision, and it involves multiple competing factors that must be evaluated rapidly. If the medical advice indicates that the passenger requires hospital treatment within 1-2 hours, I must divert. The key question is: where? Over the mid-Atlantic, the options are limited: eastbound options might include the Azores (Lajes, LPLA) or possibly an Iberian peninsula airport depending on position; westbound options might include Bermuda (TXKF), or if further west, a Caribbean island or eastern Canadian airport (Gander, Halifax).

The choice depends on: distance and time to each option at current speed and altitude, the medical facility capability at the diversion airport (a small Azores hospital may not have the specialist capability the passenger needs), weather at the diversion airport, fuel remaining versus fuel required to reach the airport with required reserves (including ETOPS contingency), and the runway length and approach capability. The ETP (Equal Time Point) calculations from the OFP tell me which direction is quicker, but medical capability may override pure time considerations — a hospital 30 minutes further away with a cardiac catheterisation lab could be the better choice for a suspected heart attack.

CRM and Crew Coordination — With an augmented crew on the B787, I have three pilots available to manage the workload. The Captain will make the diversion decision, but I would support by: pulling the ETOPS alternate weather and fuel data from the FMC and OFP, calculating fuel remaining to each potential diversion airport, communicating with ATC to request a clearance for the diversion (declaring PAN PAN MEDICAL and requesting priority handling), and coordinating with the cabin crew on passenger management — the medical emergency passenger needs continued attention, the remaining passengers need a calm, informative PA explaining the diversion, and the cabin must be prepared for landing (earlier than expected, so meal service and cabin stowage need to be managed). The third pilot can be invaluable here: if one pilot flies and one manages the medical communication and diversion planning, the third pilot handles the ATC communication and fuel calculations, distributing workload across the crew.

Landing and Aftermath — Once the diversion airport is selected, the crew must prepare for a potentially overweight landing if the diversion is early in the flight — the B787 does have fuel jettison capability, and the Commander may elect to dump fuel to reach maximum landing weight if time and the medical urgency permit. The approach briefing must be conducted for an airport that may not have been planned or briefed: checking the available approach procedures, runway length, weather, and any NOTAMs. After landing, the medical passenger is handed over to airport medical services, the aircraft must be refuelled and potentially reinspected (overweight landing may require an engineering check), the crew must reassess their remaining duty time and fatigue status (augmented crew FDP calculations change with a diversion), and the passengers need managing — TUI's ground operations team would coordinate onward transportation, and the crew would communicate with TUI Operations Control for guidance on whether to continue to Cancún or return to the UK. Every decision in this chain demonstrates the CRM, decision-making, and communication skills that TUI's assessment process is designed to identify.

Safety First — Non-Negotiable — De-icing is a safety requirement, not a preference. If contamination is present on critical surfaces (wings, stabiliser, control surfaces), the aircraft does not depart until de-icing is complete and holdover time is adequate. The B737 MAX 8 FCOM is explicit: takeoff is prohibited with frost, ice, or snow on wings or stabiliser. The turnaround team's urgency is understood — cascading delays affect passengers across all three sectors — but the decision to de-ice and the timing of departure rests with the flight crew, not the ground handling team. I would not compromise on de-icing under any pressure. Holdover Time Management — While the aircraft is being de-iced, I would actively manage the holdover time window. Type I fluid (heated mixture of glycol and water) provides short-term protection measured in minutes — typically 3–15 minutes depending on OAT and precipitation type. Type IV fluid (thickened, longer-lasting) provides extended holdover, potentially 30–80 minutes in light freezing conditions. I would note the exact time de-icing is completed, calculate the holdover expiry, and ensure we can reach the runway and commence the takeoff roll before holdover expires. If active precipitation continues and holdover time is insufficient, a second application may be required — this must be communicated to the de-icing team immediately, not discovered at the hold point.

Cascade Management — Inform, Don't Absorb — The 3-sector day cascade is an operational planning problem. My responsibility is to operate this sector safely and communicate the delay accurately. I would inform TUI Operations via ACARS of the departure delay and estimated new departure time. TUI Ops will then manage the downstream impact: adjusting slot times at the destination, notifying handling agents at sectors 2 and 3, potentially arranging crew replacements if the delay pushes the crew into FTL limits, and managing passenger expectations. The temptation to rush — accept a marginal holdover time, skip the post-de-icing check, or taxi fast — must be actively resisted.

Manchester Winter Context — Manchester Airport (EGCC) is TUI's second-largest base and regularly experiences winter de-icing events from November through March. The airport's three runways (23L/05R, 23R/05L, and the taxiway occasionally used for de-icing operations) and dedicated de-icing facilities can become congested during heavy frost or freezing fog events when multiple operators require treatment simultaneously. TUI pilots based at Manchester should factor de-icing delays into their personal planning during winter months — arrive early, brief thoroughly, and approach delays calmly. On the B737 MAX, the LEAP-1B engines are no more or less susceptible to icing than the CFM56-7B, but the engine inlet anti-ice system must be ON whenever icing conditions exist or are anticipated.

Recognition — Possible MCAS Runaway or Stabiliser Trim Runaway — Uncommanded nose-down pitch with the stabiliser trim running without pilot input on the B737 MAX is a critical situation that must be addressed immediately. While the MCAS (Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System) was redesigned following the Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302 accidents — now requiring inputs from both angle-of-attack (AoA) sensors before activating, limiting authority to a single application, and never commanding more nose-down than the pilot can counteract — any uncommanded stabiliser trim movement must be treated as a potential runaway trim event. The cause could be MCAS malfunction, stabiliser trim motor failure, or a wiring fault.

Immediate Actions — Memory Items — The Boeing 737 Runaway Stabiliser memory items apply identically on the MAX: if the stabiliser trim is running uncommanded, first — control the aircraft with the control column (apply aft column pressure to counteract the nose-down pitch). Second — disengage the autopilot. Third — if the trim continues to run uncommanded, move the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. On the B737 MAX, there are two cutout switches: one for the primary trim motor and one for the autopilot trim motor. Placing both to CUTOUT electrically disconnects all electric trim — including MCAS. After cutout, manual trim is available using the trim wheel on the centre pedestal. This requires physical effort, particularly at higher speeds.

Manual Trim and Recovery — With the electric trim cut out, I would manually retrim the aircraft using the trim wheel to relieve control column forces. If the stabiliser has moved significantly nose-down before cutout, the column force may be substantial. Technique: reduce speed to reduce aerodynamic loads (but maintain above minimum manoeuvring speed), then use the manual trim wheel to adjust the stabiliser position. Once the aircraft is trimmed and controllable, I would coordinate with the Captain for a return to East Midlands (runway 27, 2,893 metres) or a diversion — the closest suitable airport with adequate runway length and fire services. Declare a MAYDAY, advise ATC of the situation, and request priority handling. Post-Incident and TUI Context — TUI Airways was among the operators affected by the worldwide B737 MAX grounding from March 2019 to early 2021. The re-certification included MCAS software redesign, additional pilot training, and flight computer hardware updates. TUI Airways' B737 MAX fleet (currently approximately 23 aircraft, growing to ~37 with BOC Aviation deliveries) is operated by approximately 300 specially trained pilots. The airline's MAX-specific training includes detailed MCAS awareness, runaway stabiliser trim response, and unreliable AoA indications. Understanding this history — and the specific memory items — is essential for any pilot operating or interviewing for TUI's MAX fleet.