Transavia Pilot Interview Questions 2026

System Description and Function — The Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System on the Boeing 737-800 is manufactured by Honeywell and provides terrain awareness through two complementary technologies: reactive alerts based on radio altimeter data and barometric rate of descent, and predictive alerts based on GPS position compared against a worldwide terrain and obstacle database. The reactive mode — the original GPWS function — generates warnings for five specific flight conditions: excessive descent rate relative to terrain proximity, excessive terrain closure rate, altitude loss after takeoff or go-around, unsafe terrain clearance when not in landing configuration, and excessive deviation below the glideslope on an ILS approach. Each mode produces specific aural alerts — PULL UP, TERRAIN TERRAIN, DON'T SINK, TOO LOW GEAR, TOO LOW FLAPS, GLIDESLOPE — accompanied by visual warnings on the primary flight display. The predictive mode — the Enhanced component — uses GPS-derived position and projected flight path to look ahead and detect terrain conflicts up to 60 seconds before impact, generating TERRAIN AHEAD or OBSTACLE AHEAD caution alerts followed by PULL UP warnings if the conflict persists.

Terrain Display and Crew Response — The EGPWS terrain display is available on the navigation display, showing terrain coloring relative to the aircraft's altitude: green for terrain well below the aircraft, yellow for terrain approaching the aircraft's altitude, and red for terrain at or above the aircraft's altitude. Peaks and obstacles are highlighted with specific symbology. The crew response to an EGPWS PULL UP warning is a memory item — immediate maximum performance escape maneuver: disconnect autopilot, advance thrust to TOGA, rotate to the appropriate pitch attitude while respecting bank angle restrictions, and follow the flight director EGPWS escape guidance if available. There is no time for consultation, no checklist, no debate — when the system says PULL UP, the pilot pulls up immediately. Compliance with EGPWS warnings has effectively eliminated controlled flight into terrain at airlines that properly train and enforce this response. The key teaching point is that EGPWS should never activate during normal operations — if it does, something has already gone significantly wrong in the crew's terrain awareness and procedure compliance.

Relevance to Transavia's Challenging Airports — EGPWS awareness is critical at several airports in Transavia's network where terrain proximity during normal approach profiles can trigger nuisance alerts if the crew is not properly prepared. At Innsbruck, the visual dog-leg approach in a narrow valley with 9,000-foot terrain to the north means the EGPWS terrain display will show extensive yellow and red terrain throughout the approach — the crew must distinguish between expected terrain proximity on a normal approach and a genuine terrain conflict.

At Santorini, the offset VOR approaches routing around a 1,223-foot mountain on extended finals for Runway 16 require awareness that the EGPWS may generate alerts during the maneuvering phase if the aircraft is momentarily closer to terrain than the system's look-ahead algorithm expects. At Funchal, the circling approach around terrain to a runway on an elevated platform involves descent in proximity to hillsides that will illuminate on the terrain display. For all Category C airports, pilots complete specific simulator training that includes EGPWS interaction during the approach profiles, so they learn to interpret the terrain display in context rather than being surprised by alerts during actual operations.

System Limitations and Pilot Awareness — Despite its life-saving capability, EGPWS has limitations that pilots must understand. The terrain database, while comprehensive, is periodically updated and may not reflect very recent construction or temporary obstacles. The predictive mode depends on GPS position accuracy — if GPS is degraded, the forward-looking terrain avoidance function may be less reliable. The system's look-ahead algorithms use the current flight path projection, meaning a sudden unplanned turn toward terrain may not generate sufficient warning time if the terrain was outside the previous scan corridor.

The reactive modes dependent on the radio altimeter are susceptible to terrain with steep gradients — if the aircraft flies over a cliff edge where terrain drops sharply away, the radio altimeter may show a sudden altitude increase that could mask a subsequent terrain rise. For Transavia pilots, the practical lesson is that EGPWS is a final safety barrier, not a navigation tool — the primary terrain avoidance comes from thorough approach briefings, adherence to published procedures, proper altitude management, and continuous terrain awareness using the navigation display, charts, and visual references.

Initial Response: Aviate First — When the examiner introduces a non-memory item emergency on approach during the simulator assessment at EPST, my first action is not to reach for the QRH. My first action is to ensure the aircraft is in a safe state. I check altitude, speed, configuration, and flight path — aviate, navigate, communicate, in that order. If we are established on approach and the aircraft is stable, I verbally acknowledge the abnormal indication to the other candidate: I see we have a the indication on the panel, I am assessing. This confirms to the assessor that I have identified the abnormal and I am prioritizing correctly. If the abnormal requires immediate attention — a warning light or master caution — I identify which system is affected by scanning the annunciator panel on the 737. The assessors are watching for a calm, structured response: not panic, not freezing, and not immediately diving into the QRH while losing awareness of the approach profile.

Workload Distribution and QRH Procedure — Once I confirm the aircraft is stable and we have adequate altitude and time, I would coordinate with the other candidate to distribute workload. If I am PM, I would say: I am going to open the QRH to the the affected system section, you continue flying the approach and call out any deviations. If I am PF, I would say: I need you to run the QRH for the system abnormality while I continue flying — let me know each action item before you execute.

The QRH on the 737 is a physical handbook organized by system, and the correct section must be found manually — this is where preparation and familiarity with the QRH layout pay off. I would read each action item aloud, confirm with the other pilot that the action is appropriate and they are ready, execute the action, and confirm the result. If an action item requires a configuration change that affects the approach — such as a system limitation that changes Vref or flap availability — I would stop the checklist, brief the impact on the approach, and then resume. The assessors want to see methodical, verified execution — not speed.

Communication and Decision-Making — Throughout the process, I would maintain ATC communication and inform them of our status if it affects the approach: Amsterdam approach, [callsign], we are dealing with a minor technical issue, request vectors for another approach if we need additional time. This is not required for every abnormal, but if the emergency resolution is taking time and we are getting close to the final approach fix, extending the approach or requesting a hold buys time without the pressure of descending while simultaneously running a checklist. I would also assess whether the abnormal changes our landing considerations: does it affect braking, flap availability, or go-around capability? If the abnormal degrades go-around performance, I need to know that before committing to the approach — because a missed approach with a degraded system may be more dangerous than a stabilized approach and landing. This decision-making process is what the TACO selection committee is evaluating: can this candidate think ahead while managing the present?

Assessment Context and Trainability — The simulator assessment at EPST is deliberately designed to be challenging but fair. The assessors are not expecting airline-standard execution from a candidate who may not have 737 type experience — they are evaluating trainability, CRM, and safe airmanship. The non-memory item emergency is specifically chosen to not be an engine failure, because engine failures are memory items with immediate actions that candidates might have rehearsed. Instead, the abnormal tests the candidate's ability to use the QRH systematically, manage workload collaboratively, and maintain flight path awareness simultaneously. If I make an error during the procedure — selecting the wrong QRH section, missing a step, or losing altitude awareness — the recovery matters more than the error. Acknowledging the mistake, correcting it, and continuing calmly demonstrates exactly the trainability and self-awareness that Transavia values. The worst response is to try to hide the error or to become flustered and lose control of the procedure. The assessment is about the process, not perfection.

My Immediate Response — Oxygen Masks and Memory Items — If I notice cabin altitude climbing through 8,000 feet at FL370 on the B737-800, I would recognise this as a loss of pressurisation — a time-critical emergency. I would not wait to determine whether this is a rapid or slow decompression. My immediate memory items: don my oxygen mask and establish communication through the mask microphone, select 100% oxygen and ensure the mask is sealed, and verify the other pilot's mask is on and functioning. At FL370, the time of useful consciousness without supplemental oxygen is approximately 30–60 seconds for a rapid decompression, or several minutes for a slow leak. The passenger masks deploy automatically at approximately 14,000 feet cabin altitude, so at 8,000 feet they have not yet deployed. I must act now, because once hypoxia sets in, my ability to recognise my own cognitive impairment degrades rapidly.

Emergency Descent — With masks on and communication established, the next action is an emergency descent to a safe altitude. The PF disconnects the autopilot, retards the thrust levers to idle, deploys the speed brakes, and initiates a descent at VMO/MMO — 340 knots or Mach 0.82, whichever is limiting — targeting a level-off altitude at or below 10,000 feet where cabin altitude can be maintained at a breathable level without supplemental oxygen. Simultaneously, the PM squawks 7700 on the transponder, declares MAYDAY on the current ATC frequency — MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY, [callsign], loss of pressurization, emergency descent to flight level one-zero-zero — and requests clearance for the descent. At FL370 en route to Faro over France or Spain, terrain is generally not a factor for a descent to 10,000 feet, but the PM verifies the minimum safe altitude from the charts. The descent from FL370 to FL100 at maximum rate takes approximately 3-4 minutes. During the descent, I would also turn the pressurization mode selector to manual and attempt to close the outflow valve to restore pressurization — if the cause is a controller failure rather than a structural breach, this may arrest the cabin altitude climb.

Troubleshooting and Diversion Decision — Once level at a safe altitude with the cabin altitude under control, the crew can assess the situation more deliberately. The QRH pressurization failure checklist guides the crew through identifying the cause: is the outflow valve fully closed, are the pack valves open, are the bleed air valves supplying the packs, is there a visible structural breach? On the 737-800, the pressurization system consists of two automatic controllers and a manual mode — if both automatic controllers have failed, manual control through the outflow valve toggle switch may restore pressurization. If pressurization cannot be restored — indicating a structural issue such as a seal failure, window crack, or door seal leak — the aircraft must remain at 10,000 feet or below for the remainder of the flight. At FL100, fuel burn is dramatically higher than at FL370 — roughly 40-50% more per hour — and the range to Faro may no longer be achievable with the remaining fuel. I would immediately calculate whether we can reach Faro at FL100 or whether a diversion to a closer suitable airport — Bordeaux, Bilbao, Porto, or Lisbon depending on position — is required.

Passenger and Cabin Management — Throughout the emergency, the cabin crew needs clear, timely information. As soon as the emergency descent is initiated, the PM or PF makes a brief PA: cabin crew, be seated immediately. After leveling off, a more detailed PA explains the situation: ladies and gentlemen, we experienced a pressurization issue and descended to a lower altitude as a precaution. The aircraft is fully under control and we are assessing our options. If diverting, the crew informs passengers of the new destination.

The senior cabin crew member should be contacted via interphone for a cabin status report: any injuries from the descent, any signs of structural damage visible from the cabin such as misting, unusual airflow, or noise, and the status of any passengers who may have been affected by the altitude — particularly infants, elderly, or passengers with respiratory conditions. After landing, whether at Faro or a diversion airport, I would file a detailed safety report through Q-Pulse and ensure the aircraft is inspected by maintenance before any further operation. The CVR and FDR data should be preserved for the investigation. Transavia's B737-800 fleet regularly operates the AMS-FAO sector at FL370, and recurrent training covers the depressurisation scenario specifically for these overwater and overland European sectors.

I Would Address It Directly and Early — If I notice my assigned captain consistently omits the landing checklist below 1,000 feet, I would not wait for a problem to occur before speaking up. My first approach would be to initiate the checklist myself: "Landing checklist." If the captain dismisses it — "I've been doing this 20 years, we don't need it" — I would be direct: "Captain, I'd prefer to run it — it's our last barrier before touchdown." A captain who consistently skips the checklist is normalising deviation in the most safety-critical phase of flight. Twenty years of experience where the checklist caught nothing creates the illusion it is unnecessary, while the one flight where it would have caught an error has not happened yet. If the pattern continues, I would document it and report it through the safety management system.

Graduated Approach Over Multiple Flights — As a one-month-old first officer, I would not confront this on the first occasion. On the first flight, I would observe and confirm it is a consistent pattern, not a one-time oversight. On the second flight, I would use the probe step: approaching 1,000 feet, I would initiate the checklist myself by calling landing checklist. This fulfills the PM duty and gives the captain the opportunity to respond normally. If the captain waves it off — we are fine, I have got it — I now have a data point that this is deliberate, not accidental. On the third flight, I would be more direct during the approach briefing: captain, I would like to run the landing checklist at 1,000 feet as per SOP — it helps me stay in the loop as PM. This frames the request as my need rather than his failure, reducing defensiveness. Most experienced captains will respond positively to a first officer who takes their PM duties seriously.

Escalation If the Pattern Continues — If after several flights the captain continues to skip the landing checklist despite my requests, I would escalate through the proper channels. The first step is an informal conversation with my fleet manager, base captain, or training captain — someone in a supervisory role who can address the behavior without it becoming a formal complaint. I would describe the pattern factually: captain [name] consistently omits the landing checklist below 1,000 feet on the sectors I have flown with him. I have requested it multiple times and been declined. I would not frame this as a personality conflict — it is a procedural compliance issue that the training department needs to know about. If the informal conversation does not resolve it, I would file a safety report through Q-Pulse documenting the dates, sectors, and my attempts to address it. Transavia's just culture framework protects this report, and the safety department can address it through recurrent training or a standards check without it becoming adversarial.

Protecting Myself and the Operation — Regardless of how the captain responds, I would protect myself and the passengers on every flight. If the captain will not run the landing checklist, I run it myself — out loud, systematically, confirming each item. Gear down — three green. Flaps — set. Autobrakes — armed. Even if the captain does not respond to each item, I have performed the safety function the checklist is designed to accomplish. If I ever notice an item is not correctly set — gear not down, flaps not at the correct setting — I call it immediately: captain, gear is not down, go-around. The scenario tests whether a new first officer has the maturity to address a senior captain's deviation without either being confrontational or being compliant. The answer Transavia wants is: address it professionally, escalate through proper channels if needed, but never stop performing the safety function yourself. A first officer who shrugs and accepts captain, I have been doing this for 20 years is a first officer whose error-trapping barrier has been disabled — and that is exactly how accidents happen.

Two Separate Airlines, One Brand — Transavia operates as two legally distinct airlines sharing the same brand: Transavia Netherlands (HV, ICAO: TRA) based at Amsterdam Schiphol with secondary bases at Eindhoven and Rotterdam, and Transavia France (TO, ICAO: TVF) based at Paris Orly with bases at Lyon, Nantes, and Montpellier. Despite the shared livery and brand name, they hold separate Air Operator Certificates, separate pilot seniority lists, separate collective agreements, and recruit independently. Transavia Netherlands falls under KLM's operational umbrella, while Transavia France falls under Air France's umbrella.

Career Implications — The Critical Difference — For Transavia France pilots, careers are managed on a single seniority list shared with Air France. This means a Transavia France pilot can progress to Air France long-haul operations (A350, 787, 777) as seniority allows — an extraordinary career pathway for a low-cost leisure carrier. Transavia Netherlands does NOT share a seniority list with KLM. Dutch Transavia pilots have a separate career track, though internal mobility to KLM is possible through separate application processes. Understanding this distinction is essential when choosing which Transavia entity to apply to, and demonstrates to the panel that you have done serious research.

Strategic Role Within AF-KLM — Transavia is the group's low-cost leisure arm, designed to capture price-sensitive leisure traffic that neither Air France nor KLM can profitably serve with their full-service products. Transavia's cost base is approximately 30-40% lower than the mainline carriers, achieved through higher aircraft utilisation, simpler cabin product (single class, ancillary revenue model), and leaner ground operations. The group strategy positions Transavia to compete directly with easyJet, Vueling, and Ryanair on European leisure routes while feeding connecting long-haul traffic back to the mainline hubs. Recent Developments — Transavia Netherlands ordered A321neo aircraft to replace and supplement the B737-800 fleet, aligning with the broader AF-KLM group's Airbus standardisation (Air France operates A320 family, KLM is adding A321neo). Transavia France already operates A320 family aircraft. The fleet transition creates a period where Dutch Transavia pilots may fly both B737 and A321neo, requiring dual type knowledge. Understanding the group structure shows the TACO interview panel that you see Transavia not as a standalone budget airline but as a strategic component of Europe's largest airline group.