Pegasus Airlines Pilot Interview Questions 2026

Position Assessment — Above DA — At 300 ft on an ILS approach to SAW in fog, you are above the Decision Altitude for a CAT I ILS (DA typically around 200 ft AGL at SAW). You have visual contact with the approach lights but NOT the runway itself. At this point, the approach is still valid — you continue descending toward DA while actively looking for the required visual references. The approach lights visible at 300 ft are a positive sign that visibility is near the CAT I minimum (RVR 550 m), but approach lights alone do not constitute the visual reference required to land.

What You Need at DA — Under ICAO and SHGM regulations (aligned with EASA standards), to continue below DA on a CAT I ILS, the pilot must have in sight at least one of the following: elements of the approach light system, the threshold, threshold markings, threshold lights, the runway end identifier lights, the visual approach slope indicator (PAPI/VASI), the touchdown zone, touchdown zone markings, or touchdown zone lights. Approach lights ARE on this list — but critically, if you can see approach lights only and nothing else at DA, some operators restrict the descent below DA to no lower than 100 ft above the touchdown zone elevation unless the runway or runway markings become visible. Check Pegasus SOP for the specific company limitation — this varies between operators.

Decision at DA — The Critical Moment — At DA, if you see only approach lights: you may continue the approach below DA (per most CAT I rules, approach lights are sufficient to continue), BUT you must see the runway environment (threshold, touchdown zone, or markings) before reaching the visual segment below 100 ft above TDZE. If at any point below DA you lose visual reference or cannot identify the runway, you execute an immediate go-around — no hesitation. The correct callouts at DA: if visual reference is adequate, PM calls 'Runway in sight' or 'Approach lights in sight, continuing'; if not, PM calls 'Go around' and the PF initiates the missed approach. On the A320neo, in Normal Law, the go-around is initiated by pressing the TOGA buttons — pitch 15° nose-up, follow the SRS guidance.

SAW-Specific Considerations — This scenario is routine at SAW during winter fog season (November–March). The ILS on RWY 06L (ISAB, 109.90 MHz) and RWY 24R (ISBH, 110.90 MHz) are CAT I only — there is no CAT II or CAT III capability to fall back on. The published warning that autopilot-coupled approach below 554 ft is not recommended means you may be hand-flying the final segment in 550 m RVR visibility — demanding precise instrument technique.

If you go around, the missed approach for RWY 06 routes you toward rising terrain (Kocaeli hills east of the field) — follow the published procedure precisely. If SAW goes below minimums during the approach, your pre-briefed alternates (IST, ESB, ADB, Yenişehir) become your next destination. The panel wants to see that you understand this is a disciplined DA decision, not a gamble.

I Would Assess Whether I Can Complete the Sector Safely — If operating the last sector from Antalya to SAW late at night after a long day, I would honestly evaluate my fatigue state. If I am fatigued but manageable — I would increase automation, share tasks, and maintain discipline. If I am genuinely impaired, I would call operations before departing Antalya. It is far better to declare fatigue at the outstation than to discover mid-flight that I cannot concentrate.

Address the Missing Briefing Immediately — The captain beginning the approach without a full briefing is the most actionable threat. You must speak up NOW, not after the approach goes wrong. A direct, professional intervention: 'Captain, before we continue, I would like to do a full approach brief. We have marginal weather, a gusty crosswind, and it is the end of a long day — I want to make sure we are both on the same page for this approach.' If the captain brushes you off, escalate: 'Captain, I am not comfortable beginning this approach without a proper brief.

Can we take 60 seconds to cover the key threats and our decision gates?' This is assertive CRM in a high-PDI environment (Turkey: 66) — exactly what the panel wants to see from an FO. Pegasus's board interview tests whether you will accept a degraded safety standard from a fatigued or disengaged captain, or whether you will restore the standard through communication.

Brief What Matters — If you drive the brief, cover the essentials: approach type (ILS RWY 06L or 24R, CAT I), DA, RVR/visibility requirements, missed approach procedure (including terrain considerations — Kocaeli hills east of SAW if approaching RWY 06), crosswind technique (maximum demonstrated crosswind for type, and your personal limit for night operations in gusts — consider reducing your personal limit given fatigue), decision gates ('If we are not stabilised by 1,000 ft, we go around — no discussion'), and the captain's state ('Captain, how are you feeling? Are you comfortable continuing or do you want me to fly this approach?'). Offering to fly is not undermining the captain — it is good CRM. A fatigued captain who has been quiet all day may be relieved to have an engaged FO take the active role.

Execute or Go Around — No Middle Ground — If you fly the approach: stabilised approach criteria must be met by 1,000 ft AGL (on speed, on path, configured, correct thrust setting). The crosswind of 18 gusting 26 kt will require crab or wing-low technique and may produce significant drift correction on short final — at night in reduced visibility, this demands full concentration. If ANY parameter is outside stabilised criteria at 1,000 ft: go around, no negotiation.

If the captain has not briefed or engaged and is not functioning as an effective crew member, the risk of continuing a demanding approach with a crew that is not aligned is unacceptable. A go-around from a safe altitude with full fuel for the alternate is always the correct decision when the crew is not functioning as a team. After the go-around, reassess: attempt again with a full brief, or divert to IST (63 km, better weather likely, 5 runways, CAT III). File a safety report post-flight documenting the captain's failure to brief.

B737 Manual Reversion — The Boeing 737 is designed to be flyable with complete hydraulic failure through manual reversion. The flight controls (ailerons, elevator, rudder) are connected to the control surfaces via cables and push-rods — physical mechanical linkage. With total loss of Systems A, B, and Standby, the pilot can still move the control surfaces by direct physical force through the control column and rudder pedals. However, manual reversion requires substantial physical effort because there is no hydraulic assistance — control forces increase significantly, particularly at higher speeds.

The ailerons and elevator remain mechanically connected and functional. The rudder has a manual backup through the standby system and direct cable connection. Stabiliser trim is available via the manual trim wheel on the centre pedestal — this is critical because electric trim is lost without hydraulics/electrics. The aircraft can be flown and landed in manual reversion, but it demands significant physical strength and crew coordination.

A320 Mechanical Backup — Fundamentally Different — The Airbus A320 is a fly-by-wire aircraft with NO mechanical linkage between the sidestick and the flight control surfaces (except for the THS trim wheel and rudder pedals). In the event of total flight computer failure or total hydraulic loss, the aircraft enters Mechanical Backup — which provides only pitch control (via the manual THS trim wheel on the centre pedestal) and yaw control (via rudder pedals connected mechanically to the rudder). Roll control is COMPLETELY UNAVAILABLE in Mechanical Backup — there is no cable, pushrod, or any physical connection between the sidestick and the ailerons or spoilers. The pilot controls pitch by turning the trim wheel (slow response) and uses rudder for directional control and induced roll via dihedral effect.

The Critical Difference — The Boeing philosophy preserves full three-axis manual control authority in the worst case — you lose hydraulic assistance but retain roll, pitch, and yaw through physical linkage. The Airbus philosophy accepts the loss of roll authority in the worst case — Mechanical Backup is considered a survivable-but-emergency configuration with the expectation that the multiple layers of FBW redundancy (2× ELAC, 3× SEC, 2× FAC across three hydraulic systems plus RAT) make total loss extremely improbable. The practical implication: a 737 pilot in manual reversion is flying a heavy but controllable aircraft on all three axes. An A320 pilot in Mechanical Backup is managing a much more limited control state and must divert immediately.

Mixed-Fleet Awareness at Pegasus — This difference is one of the most important transition risks for Pegasus pilots moving between the 737-800 and A320neo via CCQ. A pilot trained on the 737, where manual reversion preserves all axes, may instinctively expect the same capability on the A320 — and discovering in a dual-engine-failure scenario that roll is unavailable would be a critical surprise.

Conversely, an A320 pilot transitioning to the 737 may underestimate the physical demands of manual reversion and the need for active manual trim management. The Pegasus Training Centre in Kurtköy has Level D simulators for both types, and CCQ training explicitly addresses these differences. Understanding this question thoroughly demonstrates that you think about what happens when automation fails — which is exactly the mindset the panel wants to see.

I Would Focus on My Own Performance — If a Turkish FO with less experience is promoted ahead of me as an expat, I would not let resentment affect my professionalism. I would ask myself: what can I learn from this? Are there areas where I can improve? If I genuinely believe the promotion process was unfair, I would raise it through appropriate HR channels — but I would not let it affect my cockpit performance or my relationship with colleagues.

Seek Understanding Before Judgment — Before assuming unfairness, seek information. Pegasus may have a seniority system based on date of joining, not total flight hours. Turkish labour law and company policy may give priority to Turkish-contracted employees over expatriate contractors for certain internal positions. The 'less experienced' Turkish FO may have attributes you cannot see: company-specific qualifications, additional ratings, instructor credentials, language capability for all-Turkish domestic operations, or performance evaluations that differ from hours flown. Ask your line manager or fleet captain for feedback on what criteria drive promotion and what you can do to strengthen your candidacy. That reflects maturity — pilots who assume conspiracy without data are difficult to work with.

Control What You Can Control — Focus on your own performance and development. Continue building hours, maintain a clean operational record, volunteer for challenging routes or assignments, pursue additional qualifications (instructor rating, ETOPS, CCQ if available), and build relationships across the operation. If the promotion criteria are genuinely based on factors you cannot change (nationality, contract type), then you have a business decision to make — but make it based on data, not emotion. If Pegasus's career progression for expat pilots is genuinely limited compared to Turkish pilots, that is information worth having before your next contract renewal, not a reason to underperform today.

Maintain Professional Standards — The most important thing the panel needs to hear: regardless of promotion decisions, your performance in the cockpit does not change. You do not fly a less diligent approach because you are disappointed. You do not stop supporting your captain because you feel undervalued. You do not poison crew morale by complaining about the decision during multi-sector days. Professional behaviour during professional disappointment is what separates mature pilots from reactive ones. In a cockpit with a Hofstede PDI of 66, where hierarchy shapes daily interactions, demonstrating that you can absorb a setback and continue performing at full capability is genuinely impressive — and the panel knows it.

The Challenge — Pegasus's dual B737/A320neo fleet means some pilots may transition between types. The core differences that create transition risk: control input (yoke with force feedback vs sidestick without), automation philosophy (MCP/autothrottle vs FCU/autothrust), emergency procedure presentation (QRH vs ECAM), thrust management (thrust levers move with autothrottle on Boeing vs stationary in CLB detent on Airbus), and flight control philosophy (mechanical backup on B737 vs fly-by-wire with law protections on A320neo). These are not just technical differences — they create different muscle memory and procedural reflexes.

Preparation Approach — Before any fleet change: thorough ground school on the target type's systems and procedures. Use differences training materials provided by Pegasus. Practice chair-flying (mentally rehearsing procedures in the correct order for the target type). The critical risk period is the first 5-10 flights after switching types — this is when procedural confusion is most likely. Use enhanced briefings that explicitly state the type you are flying and its specific procedures: 'This is the A320neo. We use the FCU for altitude selection. ECAM will present abnormals. Autothrust is managed by the FADEC.'

Pegasus SOP Mitigations — Airlines with dual fleets implement specific mitigations: minimum flight hours on one type before switching, enhanced standard callouts that are type-specific, differences training focused on the highest-risk confusion points, and monitoring of incidents related to type confusion. Understanding these mitigations shows the interview panel that you recognise the dual-fleet challenge and are prepared to manage it professionally. Interview Context — If Pegasus operates dual-fleet, demonstrating awareness of the transition challenge is more valued than claiming it is easy. A strong answer: 'I recognise that Boeing and Airbus have fundamentally different cockpit philosophies. I would approach any fleet change with enhanced preparation, deliberate chair-flying, and heightened vigilance during the transition period — particularly the first 10 flights on the new type.'