Aegean Airlines Pilot Interview Questions 2026

Normal Law: Full Protection — In Normal Law, the A320's flight control computers (2 ELAC + 3 SEC + 2 FAC) provide comprehensive envelope protections that fundamentally change the pilot-aircraft relationship. Pitch: the sidestick commands load factor (g), not pitch rate — releasing the sidestick returns the aircraft to 1g flight (the aircraft trims itself to the current speed). Protections include alpha protection (at high alpha, sidestick authority is progressively reduced; at alpha max, the aircraft pitches down regardless of input), alpha floor (below a certain speed, TOGA thrust is commanded automatically), and load factor limiting (+2.5g clean, +2.0g in configuration).

Roll: the sidestick commands roll rate — releasing it levels the wings to 0° bank. Maximum bank is 67° with full deflection, with automatic bank reduction above 33° when released. Yaw: the FACs provide yaw damping, turn coordination, and rudder travel limiting. For Aegean, Normal Law is the standard operating condition: it provides the envelope protections that enable confident handling during Meltemi crosswind approaches at Mykonos and Santorini, knowing the aircraft will not exceed structural limits regardless of gust intensity.

Alternate Law: Reduced Protections — Alternate Law activates when specific redundancy is lost — typically failure of 2 or more ADIRU (Air Data Inertial Reference Units), certain double hydraulic failures, or specific ELAC/SEC failures. The transition is indicated by the amber ECAM alert 'ALTN LAW' and an amber X replacing the green = sign on the PFD speed scale. In Alternate Law, some protections are retained and some are lost. Pitch: load factor demand is maintained, but alpha protection changes to alpha limitation (a softer boundary — the pilot can exceed it with sustained input) and alpha floor is LOST (no automatic TOGA thrust).

Roll: direct relationship between sidestick deflection and roll rate — no bank angle protection. The aircraft will roll beyond 67° if the pilot commands it, and releasing the sidestick does NOT level the wings — it holds the current bank. Overspeed and low-speed warnings remain. For Aegean operations, Alternate Law means increased pilot monitoring requirements: without alpha floor, a speed decay during a demanding approach (Skiathos's 1,628m runway, Heraklion's cliff-edge Rwy 27) could progress to a stall without automatic protection. The pilot must actively manage speed and angle of attack.

Direct Law: Minimal Computer Intervention — Direct Law is the most degraded state before mechanical backup. It activates after multiple computer failures or when the landing gear is extended in Alternate Law (below a certain logic condition). In Direct Law, sidestick deflection directly commands control surface deflection with no computer augmentation — no load factor demand, no speed stability, no bank angle protection, no alpha protection, no yaw damping. The aircraft handles like a conventional un-augmented aircraft: the pilot must manually trim, manage speed stability (if the aircraft accelerates, it will NOT self-correct back to the trimmed speed), and maintain safe angle of attack through instrument scan and technique. The PFD shows an amber USE MAN PITCH TRIM message. For Aegean pilots, Direct Law handling is trained in the simulator but almost never encountered in line operations — the system architecture (triple redundancy in most paths) makes progression to Direct Law extremely unlikely. However, the technical interview tests whether you understand the degradation path and what pilot actions change at each level.

Mechanical Backup: Last Resort — If all flight control computers fail (ELAC, SEC, FAC all lost), the A320 reverts to mechanical backup: the Trimmable Horizontal Stabiliser (THS) provides pitch control through manual trim wheels in the centre pedestal, and the rudder provides directional and limited roll control through the rudder pedals connected mechanically to the rudder actuator. There are NO ailerons or spoilers available — the only roll authority comes from the rudder's yaw-roll coupling effect. This is a dire emergency requiring immediate landing at the nearest suitable airport. For the Aegean interview, you are unlikely to be tested deeply on mechanical backup, but knowing it exists and that pitch = manual THS trim and roll = rudder only demonstrates complete system understanding. When answering this question, use the 'funnel' approach: start with Normal Law (daily operations), progress through Alternate and Direct (degraded states), and end with Mechanical Backup — this mirrors the degradation path and shows systematic thinking.

I Would Immediately Take Manual Control — If the autopilot disconnects at 800ft AGL during a non-precision VOR approach to Mykonos Rwy 34 in 30kt gusting Meltemi, I would take positive manual control of the aircraft and announce: "I have control, autopilot disconnect." This is one of the most demanding approaches in European commercial aviation: no ILS precision guidance, 1,902m × 30m narrow runway, turbulent crosswind from the north through the Cycladic channels, and rising terrain at 1–1.5nm. I would maintain the VOR radial tracking with constant correction, continue the CDFA (Continuous Descent Final Approach) technique manually, add the appropriate gust correction to my approach speed, and maintain a stabilised approach. If at any point the approach becomes unstabilised below 500ft — excessive bank angle, airspeed deviations, or losing the radial — I would go around without hesitation.

Energy and Speed Management — In gusty Meltemi conditions, apply the standard Vapp correction: half the steady wind component above 15kt + full gust factor. For 030/30G40: if Rwy 34 (heading 340°), the crosswind component from 030° is approximately 15kt with 27kt headwind — but gusting to 40kt means instantaneous crosswind could reach 20kt+ and headwind could spike to 37kt. Vapp correction: approximately +5–8kt above base Vapp. On the A320neo, remember approach idle engages at Flaps 3 (not Flaps 1 as on ceo) — the higher idle thrust in gusty conditions can make deceleration difficult. The CDFA descent rate for a 3° profile at the corrected approach speed: approximately (groundspeed × 5) ft/min. Monitor groundspeed continuously — if the headwind suddenly drops (Meltemi gusts are not constant), your groundspeed increases and you will go above the profile. Be prepared to add speedbrake momentarily or extend an extra degree of flap if high.

The Captain's Questioning: CRM Under Pressure — When the Captain questions your speed management, this is a CRM test. The Captain may be observing: your speed trend is increasing (Meltemi dropped momentarily), you are above the profile (descent rate too low for the actual groundspeed), or you appear to be fighting the aircraft (over-controlling in turbulence).

Your response should be: 1) Acknowledge the observation: 'Yes, I'm seeing the speed increase — the headwind has dropped.' 2) State your corrective action: 'I'm adding speedbrake briefly to capture the profile.' 3) State the go-around threshold: 'If I cannot stabilise by 1,000 feet, I am going around.' Don't be defensive — the Captain is monitoring you, which is exactly the PM's role. If the Captain's questioning reveals a genuine concern about your approach stability, take it seriously: 'Captain, you're right — I am not comfortable with the stability. I am going around.' That reflects professional humility and safety discipline.

Go-Around Decision at Mykonos — The stable approach criteria at Mykonos must be enforced strictly: by the published MDA (higher than ILS DA due to non-precision procedure), the aircraft must be: on the correct track (VOR radial ±½ dot), at the correct speed (Vapp ±5kt, allowing for gust corrections), in the correct configuration (gear down, landing flap), and at a descent rate not exceeding 1,000 ft/min. In 30kt gusting Meltemi, meeting these criteria is genuinely challenging — the approach may not stabilise despite best technique. If it does not stabilise, the go-around is the ONLY acceptable outcome. The missed approach routes away from the terrain to the south. After the go-around, assess: is a second attempt viable (has the wind changed?), or is diversion to Santorini (85nm), Athens (85nm), or another island the safer option? The panel wants to hear unwavering go-around discipline — Aegean's 26-year zero-fatality record depends on pilots who do not push marginal approaches.

Describe the Go-Around Trigger — Choose a real go-around from your flying experience and describe what triggered it specifically: unstable approach (parameters outside limits at the gate altitude), windshear warning (reactive or predictive), ATC instruction (traffic on the runway, spacing issue), visibility below minima, or a personal decision that conditions were not right for a safe landing. The panel values go-arounds that were called proactively (before the gate) over those that were reactive (at the gate or below). At Aegean, go-around triggers that are operationally relevant include: Meltemi crosswind exceeding limits during approach at island airports, tailwind shift developing at airports with single-runway options (Mykonos, Santorini, Skiathos), unstable approach on non-precision profiles (higher minimums, less precise guidance), and Heraklion's unique terrain hazard where the cliff edge before Rwy 27 can mask altitude references.

Describe the Execution — Walk through the go-around mechanically: power application (TOGA or go-around thrust), pitch attitude (A320: approximately 15° nose up initially), configuration (flap retraction on schedule, gear up on positive rate), and flight path (straight ahead initially, then missed approach procedure or ATC vectors). Then describe what makes it operationally complex: at island airports, the missed approach may route toward terrain (Heraklion Rwy 27: right turn mandatory due to mountains behind), or the single-runway configuration means you must manage spacing for a second attempt. The A320's go-around in PW1100G configuration may have different spool-up characteristics from CFM56 variants — the neo's approach idle behaviour (doesn't engage until Flaps 3 versus Flaps 1 on ceo) affects the energy state at go-around initiation. Mentioning this neo-specific detail shows fleet technical awareness.

Crew Management During and After — The go-around is where CRM quality becomes visible. Describe how you managed the crew: during execution ('Go around, flaps — PM confirmed and executed, I maintained aircraft control and called the missed approach procedure'), ATC communication ('PM transmitted go-around to ATC while I flew — clear role separation'), and cabin management ('After stabilising in the climb, I called the cabin crew via interphone to advise we were going around and would attempt a second approach in approximately 5 minutes'). Then the post-go-around decision: 'I assessed whether conditions for a second attempt were acceptable — if the trigger was transient (traffic, brief windshear), a second approach is reasonable. If the trigger was persistent (crosswind above limits, deteriorating weather), diversion is the correct decision. I discussed the assessment with the Captain and we agreed to [specific decision].'

How You Managed the Emotional Dimension — Go-arounds create pressure — schedule delay, passenger frustration, fuel consumption, and the internal question of 'did I make the right call?' Address this honestly: 'A go-around is never a failure — it is a safety decision that worked as intended. After landing (whether from the second attempt or at an alternate), I debriefed with the Captain: what triggered the go-around, was the call timely, and would we change anything? My internal processing: I do not second-guess the go-around decision after the fact. If the parameters were outside limits or I was not confident in the approach, the go-around was correct regardless of what happened next. At Aegean, where island approaches in Meltemi conditions may produce go-around rates significantly higher than standard European airports, this mental discipline is essential — a pilot who hesitates on the go-around because of schedule pressure is exactly the pilot the airline does not need.'

I Would Verify the Returns Before Deviating — If at FL370 over the Aegean my weather radar shows what appears to be a line of CBs developing along my route but dispatch's weather package shows nothing significant, I would first verify the returns. I would tilt the radar down approximately 1–2° to paint weather at my altitude and below, then check: are the returns showing vertical development with upward tilt (indicating genuine CB)? Are they consistent over multiple sweeps? Do they correlate with any SIGMET or AIRMET for the area? I would also request PIREPs from ATC. If confirmed as convective, I would apply standard avoidance: avoid all red/magenta returns by at least 20nm, never fly between cells less than 40nm apart. I would inform dispatch that their weather package appears outdated.

Decision-Making: Deviate, Hold, or Divert — With a line of cells across your path over the Aegean, your options depend on the line's extent and your fuel situation. Can you deviate around the line? (Check both sides — a line stretching 100nm may have a gap on one end.) Can you hold and wait for the cells to move or dissipate? (Summer Aegean thunderstorms typically have 30–60 minute lifecycles.) Must you divert? (If the cells block your destination and fuel does not permit holding.) Communicate with ATC early: 'Athens Control, Aegean [callsign], we are observing a line of weather at [position]. Request deviation [direction] by [distance] miles.' Greek ATC (Hellenic) will accommodate weather deviations. If over the Aegean between islands, alternates include: Heraklion, Rhodes, Thessaloniki, Athens, or any suitable Greek island airport — but verify the alternate is not also affected by the same weather system.

Crew and Cabin Coordination — Weather avoidance is a full-crew activity. Brief the PM: 'I see a line of weather at [position]. I am planning to deviate [direction]. Set up the FMS deviation and calculate the fuel impact. If the deviation adds more than [X] minutes, notify OCC via ACARS.' Cabin crew: activate the seatbelt sign proactively — do not wait until you encounter turbulence. 'This is the flight deck, cabin crew please take your seats immediately, we are expecting turbulence.' For passengers: a brief PA explaining the deviation and estimated delay. On the A320neo, remember to check the weather radar gain and tilt settings — ensure you are seeing actual weather returns and not just noise from an incorrect radar configuration.

Post-Decision Monitoring — After deviating, continuously monitor: is the deviation working (are we clearing the weather?), is the weather developing further (cells building, line expanding?), and what is our fuel status after the deviation? Summer Aegean thunderstorms can develop rapidly — what was a gap 10 minutes ago may close. Your SA must be continuous, not 'deviate and relax.' If the weather situation deteriorates beyond your fuel endurance for the planned destination, the diversion decision must be made early — diverting with comfortable fuel is always preferable to a rushed diversion with minimum reserves. For the panel: 'My decision framework for weather over the Aegean follows TEM: identify the threat (radar returns, SIGMET, PIREPs), assess options (deviate, hold, divert), execute the safest option with fuel awareness, and monitor continuously for development. I communicate early with ATC, cabin crew, and OCC. I never attempt to penetrate a line of thunderstorms — the deviation adds 10 minutes to the flight but potentially saves the aircraft.'

I Would Not Be Complacent Despite CAVOK — If inbound to Heraklion on a summer afternoon with ATIS reporting CAVOK and light winds, I would remain alert to the hazards that CAVOK does not capture. I know that summer afternoon convective activity over Crete's mountainous interior creates turbulence in the approach corridor. I would also brief the Rwy 27 cliff edge hazard — terrain drops approximately 80ft before the threshold, which can trigger the GPWS "100ft" callout prematurely. If the ATIS reports "light winds" but Meltemi conditions have been building all day, I would request a real-time wind check from tower on short final and be prepared for a southeasterly crosswind component that may have developed. I would brief a go-around as a firm option if conditions on final differ from what ATIS reported.

Proactive Threat Identification — Despite the CAVOK report, your SA requires you to identify threats that are NOT captured by METAR/ATIS: 1) Check the TAF for afternoon convective development (TCU, CB in the forecast?). 2) Listen for PIREPs from preceding aircraft — turbulence reports in the approach corridor. 3) Brief the Rwy 27 cliff hazard specifically: the PAPI is set shallower than the approach gradient, meaning following PAPI alone may put you low — cross-reference with DME/altitude checks. 4) Review the terrain behind Rwy 27 — it rises steeply 6nm from the threshold, requiring a mandatory right turn on any missed approach. 5) Check for military NOTAMs — Greek Air Force operations can create temporary restrictions or traffic conflicts. All of these threats exist in CAVOK conditions — 'good weather' at Heraklion is not the same as 'no threats at Heraklion.'

Brief the Specific Heraklion Hazards — Your approach brief should include: 'Heraklion Rwy 27, RNP approach at 3.4° (note: steeper than standard 3°). PAPI will appear to show us slightly high — this is because the PAPI angle is shallower than the 3.4° published path. Cross-check DME/altitude: at 5nm I should be at [altitude], at 3nm [altitude]. The cliff edge before the threshold drops ~80ft — GPWS may give an unexpected callout or may skip the 100ft call. Be prepared. Missed approach: mandatory right turn due to terrain rising steeply behind the field. If go-around, do NOT continue straight ahead. CAVOK today, but summer afternoon thermal turbulence is likely on approach. Light winds reported, but SE component may develop during our approach — if crosswind >20kt from the south, the field has known severe horizontal wind shear problems.'

SA as a Continuous Process — Frame for the panel: 'Situational awareness is not reading the ATIS and calling it done — it is building a comprehensive threat picture using all available information and anticipating what might develop. At Heraklion in CAVOK summer afternoon conditions, the threats are all non-weather: terrain (cliff, mountains behind), PAPI calibration, thermal turbulence, military activity, and potential SE wind development. I identify these during planning and brief them to the crew so we have a shared mental model BEFORE entering the approach. If conditions develop during the approach that were not anticipated — a sudden SE wind, unexpected turbulence, military traffic — I reassess rather than continuing on the original plan. This proactive SA approach is particularly important at airports like Heraklion that are about to close (~2027) when Kasteli Airport opens — the existing infrastructure has limitations that require pilot awareness to manage.'